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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-08" number="9851" updates="" obsoletes="" xml:lang="en" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">

  <front>
    <title abbrev="TLS 1.2 Frozen">TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze</title>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9851"/>
    <author fullname="Rich Salz">
      <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <email>rsalz@akamai.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Nimrod Aviram">
      <organization/>
      <address>
        <email>nimrod.aviram@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="January"/>
    <area>SEC</area>
    <workgroup>tls</workgroup>
    <keyword>TLS</keyword>
    <keyword>features</keyword>
    <abstract>

<t>Use of TLS 1.3, which fixes some known deficiencies in TLS 1.2, is
   growing.  This document specifies that no changes will be approved 
   for TLS 1.2 outside of urgent security fixes (as determined by 
   TLS Working Group consensus), new TLS Exporter Labels, and
   new Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs.  
   This applies to TLS only; it does not apply to DTLS (in
   any DTLS version).</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>

<section anchor="sec-reasons">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9846"/> fixes most known deficiencies with TLS 1.2 <xref target="RFC5246"/> and its use is growing.  Some examples of the fixes include
encrypting more of the traffic so that it is not readable by outsiders and
removing most cryptographic primitives that are now considered weak. Importantly, TLS
1.3 enjoys robust security proofs.</t>
      <t>Both versions have several extension points. Items like new cryptographic
algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named curves"), etc., can be
added without defining a new protocol. This document specifies that no changes will be approved for TLS 1.2 outside of
urgent security fixes (as determined by TLS Working Group consensus) and the exceptions listed in <xref target="iana"/>.</t>

      <t>This applies to TLS only. As such, it does not apply to
DTLS, in any DTLS version.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implications-for-post-quantum-cryptography-pqc">
      <name>Implications for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)</name>
      <t>Cryptographically relevant quantum computers, once available, are likely to
greatly lessen the time and effort needed to break
RSA, finite-field-based Diffie-Hellman (FFDH), or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) which are currently used in TLS.
In 2016, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a
multi-year effort to standardize algorithms that will be "safe"
once quantum computers are feasible <xref target="PQC"/>. Initial discussions in
the IETF community happened
around the same time <xref target="CFRGSLIDES"/>.</t>
      <t>In 2024, NIST released standards for <xref target="ML-KEM"/>, <xref target="ML-DSA"/>, and <xref target="SLH-DSA"/>.
Many other countries and organizations are publishing their roadmaps,
including the multi-national standards organization ETSI <xref target="ETSI"/>.</t>
      <t>While the industry was waiting for NIST to finish standardization, the
IETF has had several efforts underway.
A working group was formed in early 2023 to work on the use of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in IETF protocols
<xref target="PQUIPWG"/>.
Several other working groups, including TLS <xref target="TLSWG"/>,
are working on
specifications to support hybrid algorithms and identifiers, for use during a
transition from classic to a post-quantum world.</t>
      <t>It is important to note that effort within the TLS Working Group is  focused exclusively on TLS 1.3 or later.
Put bluntly, PQC for
TLS 1.2 will not be specified (see <xref target="iana"/>) at any time; anyone wishing
to deploy PQC should expect to use TLS 1.3.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This entire document is about security and provides post-quantum security concerns
as an additional reason to upgrade to TLS 1.3.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>No TLS registries <xref target="RFC9847"/> are being closed by this document.
Rather, this document modifies the instructions to IANA and the TLS
Designated Experts to constrain the type of entries that can be added to existing
registries.</t>
      <t>This document does not introduce any new limitations on the registrations for either of
the following two registries:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Exporter Labels</t>
        </li>
      </ul>

      <t>The following note has been added to the other TLS registries:</t>

      <blockquote><t>Any TLS entry added after the IESG approves publication of RFC 9851
      is intended for TLS 1.3 or later, and makes no similar requirement on
      DTLS.  Such entries should have an informal indication like "For TLS 1.3
      or later" in that entry, such as the "Comment" column.</t></blockquote>

      <t>At the time of publication, the note has been added to the following TLS registries:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>TLS Alerts</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Authorization Data Formats</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS CachedInformationType Values</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Certificate Compression Algorithm IDs</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Certificate Status Types</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Certificate Types</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Cipher Suites</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS ContentType</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS EC Curve Types</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS EC Point Formats</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS ExtensionType Values</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS HandshakeType</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS HashAlgorithm</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Heartbeat Message Types</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Heartbeat Modes</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS KDF Identifiers</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS PskKeyExchangeMode</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS SignatureAlgorithm</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS SignatureScheme</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Supplemental Data Formats (SupplementalDataType)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS Supported Groups</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>TLS UserMappingType Values</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
<!-- [rfced] We see that the following TLS registries have been added to 
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters>, but there are no comments for the entries.  Please review.

TLS SSLKEYLOGFILE Labels [draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile-05][RFC9847]
TLS RRC Message Types [draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-20]

While any updates would be needed for draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile and draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc, it would help us understand whether comments or Notes are expected for these registries.  
-->

<!-- RPC note: As noted in the document, these registries are untouched by this document: 
TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs
TLS Exporter Labels
-->

      <t>Any TLS registry created after this document is approved for publication
should indicate whether the actions defined here are applicable.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <displayreference target="RFC5246" to="TLS12"/>
    <displayreference target="RFC9846" to="TLS13"/>
    <displayreference target="RFC9847" to="TLS13REG"/>

    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>

	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5246.xml"/>

<!-- [RFC9846 / TLS13]
draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-14
-->
        <reference anchor="RFC9846" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date month='January' year='2026'/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9846"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9846"/>
        </reference>


<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9847.xml"/>

      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>

<!-- FIPS 203 Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard -->

<reference anchor="ML-KEM" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final">
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard</title>
    <author>
      <organization abbrev="NIST">National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
    </author>
    <date month="August" year="2024"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="NIST FIPS" value="203"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="ML-DSA" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final">
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard</title>
    <author>
      <organization abbrev="NIST">National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
    </author>
    <date month="August" year="2024"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="NIST FIPS" value="204"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="SLH-DSA" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/205/final">
  <front>
    <title>Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard</title>
    <author>
      <organization abbrev="NIST">National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
    </author>
    <date month="August" year="2024"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="NIST FIPS" value="205"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.205"/>
</reference>

        <reference anchor="PQC" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography">
          <front>
            <title>Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>NIST</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2017" month="January"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CFRGSLIDES" target="https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/95/slides/slides-95-cfrg-4.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Post Quantum Secure Cryptography Discussion</title>
            <author initials="D." surname="McGrew" fullname="David McGrew">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="April" year="2016"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>IETF 95 Proceedings</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PQUIPWG" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/pquip/about/">
          <front>
            <title>Post-Quantum Use in Protocols</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IETF</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TLSWG" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tls/about/">
          <front>
            <title>Transport Layer Security</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IETF</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ETSI" target="https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_tr/103600_103699/103619/01.01.01_60/tr_103619v010101p.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>CYBER; Migration strategies and recommendations to Quantum Safe schemes</title>
            <author>
              <organization abbrev="ETSI">European Telecommunications Standards Institute</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="July" year="2020"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ETSI TR" value="103 619"/>
          <refcontent>Version 1.1.1</refcontent>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>We gratefully acknowledge <contact fullname="Amanda Baber"/>, <contact fullname="David Dong"/>, and <contact fullname="Sabrina Tanamal"/>
of IANA for their help in revising and clarifying <xref target="iana"/>.</t>
    </section>

<!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the online 
Style Guide <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>
and let us know if any changes are needed.  Updates of this nature typically
result in more precise language, which is helpful for readers.

Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this should 
still be reviewed as a best practice.
-->

  </back>

</rfc>
